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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
V, : 
EDWIN MITCHELL, : Case No. 14471 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court, in which 
appellant was convicted of the crime of aggravated robbery, a felony 
of the first degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried on an Information alleging that he 
robbed Brenda Moore and Barbara Harris, and in so doing, used a 
deadly weapon or a facsimile thereof, to-wit: a revolver, and was 
convicted by a jury of that offense. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this Court reversing the 
judgment of the lower court and granting appellant a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brenda Bradley testified that on June 30, 1975, in the 
afternoon hours she was at the residence of Barbara Harris located 
at approximately 9th East and 13th South in Salt Lake County. She 
testified that at that time several other persons were present, 
including her three children ranging in age from three to six, 
and Barbara Harris! three children also ranging in age from three 
to six; Pat and Skip Timms and their two children, and Willie 
Harris. She further testified that between three and four o'clock 
in the afternoon she and Mrs. Harris were preparing to go to the Utah 
State Prison to visit their husbands who were inmates at that time. 
She testified that a man she knew by the nickname of "littleman" came 
into the Harris home along with another man she identified as 
the appellant, Edwin Mitchell. She testified that both men had 
guns and while the appellant stood near the door, the other man 
demanded money from the individuals who were there. She testified 
that she had approximately $138 cash in her purse and that it was 
taken by the men. She further testified that some traveler's 
checks that were not hers as well as her identification and car keys 
were taken in the robbery. She said that she observed "littleman" 
take money from Pat and Skip Timms, and she observed him hit Mr. 
Harris over the head with the sack in which he had been placing the 
money and items he was taking. The sack broke she said, and everything 
fell on the floor. She further testified that the car Mr. Harris was 
- — — ~ ^T 1 A-7?^ 
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Kenneth Timms testified that he went to the home of Barbara 
Harris between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on June 30, 1975. He further 
testified that he brought with him a .22 caliber Western style 
pistol which he gave to Mrs. Harris. He stated that Mrs. Harris put 
the gun under a pillow in her bedroom. He testified that two men 
entered Mrs. Harris1 home, one of which he identified as the 
appellant, Edwin Mitchell. He testified that the one they call 
lflittleman,f at one point hit him in the head with the barrel of a gun 
or his knuckles. He testified that the appellant went into Mrs. 
Harris1 bedroom and came out with his gun. (T.72-98) Barbara Harris 
testified in substantially the same manner as the other witnesses 
concerning the robbery and identified appellant, Edwin Mitchell 
as one of the robbers (T.125-166) as did Patricia Timms (T.98-125). 
The defense called one Kenneth Wells, who admitted that ^he 
and Edwin Mitchell did go to the residence at 1144 South 2nd East 
in Salt Lake City but stated that the purpose of their going there 
was to purchase heroin. Mr. Wells testified that appellant had 
told him that he had purchased heroin there on prior occasions and 
also that they had heard rumors on the street that heroin could be 
purchased at that address. Mr. Wells testified that appellant 
purchased two quarter tees (a measure of heroin) from Mrs. Harris and 
shot them up. He then informed Mrs. Harris that the heroin was no 
good and he wanted his money back. Mr. Wells testified he heard 
Barbara Harris and appellant argue and then he said he saw Mr. Mitchell 
pick up a bag with several balloons of heroin in it which was laying 
on a table. Mr. Wells testified neither man had a gun and that the 
only thins: takem frnm t-v>o <y~^oiA*~~~ - *»— • •-
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I 
of heroin in it. (T.189-216) 
Darryle Riddle was called by the defense to testify. The court 
sustained the prosecutor's objection to Mr. Riddle's testimony 
concerning his purchasing heroin from Barbara Harris at the 
address in question. Outside the presence of the jury, counsel for 
appellant made a proffer to the court concerning the fact that the 
undercover agent would have testified that he had in fact purchased 
heroin from Barbara Harris on September 29, 1975 and again on Oc.t:pbAi:>H^ ,^ ,„. 
2nd or 3rd of 1975 at her residence, which is the same residence in which 
the robbery in this case was alleged to have taken place. (T.248) 
The jury never heard this evidence. 
The defendant Edwin Mitchell took the stand and testified essential 
the same way as Mr. Wells had testified. He stated that they had gone 
to the Harris residence to purchase heroin; that the heroin they purchased 
was not good enough to "get off on11 • and that as they were leaving he 
grabbed a sack with several balloons of heroin in it and they fled 
the house. He further testified that they went to Tucson, Arizona. 
(T.216-234)-
Thomas Baron, a detective with the Tucson Police Department 
in Tucson, Arizona, testified over objection of appellant that he 
had arrested Kenneth Wells shortly after 2:00 p.m. on July 17, 1976 
in Tucson. He further testified that they recovered a gun which 
was later identified by the witness Kenneth Timms as a gun that was 
taken in the robbery at the Harris residence previously. (T.269-
280) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE AND ISSUES NOT NAMED OR DESCRIBED IN 
THE INFORMATION OR BILL OF PARTICULARS. 
The Information in this matter charged appellant Edwin Mitchell 
with having lfrobbed Brenda Moore and Barbara Harris, and in so doing, 
used a deadly weapon or a facsimile thereof, to-wit: a revolver." 
(R.360) On December 9, 1975, appellant's attorney made a 'Mbtion 
for Bill of Particulars pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. §77-21-9 (1953). One of the questions asked that the State 
provide a statement of the exact conduct of defendant Edwin Mitchell 
which was alleged to have been criminal. (R.364) In the Bill of 
Particulars provided by the State pursuant to the order of the court, 
Deputy County Attorney David E. Yocom answered the above questions 
as follows: nThe State contends that the defendant, together with 
one Kenneth Douglas Wells, entered the residence of Barbara Harris 
at 1144 South 200 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, and by the use of a 
deadly weapon, to-wit: a revolver, did rob Barbara Harris and 
Brenda Moore Bradley. The defendant, Edwin Mitchell, together with 
Kenneth Douglas Wells, took from the person or immediate presence of 
Brenda Moore Bradley, the approximate sum of $138 In cash and the 
approximate sum of $180 from Barbara Harris in cash.11 (R.370) 
At the trial of the case, attorney for appellant made a motion 
for mistrial on the grounds that the prosecuting attorney in his 
opening statement had stated to the jury that the appellant was 
accused of robbing not only Brenda Moore Bradley and Barbara Harris, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but also Kenneth and Patricia Timms. The prosecutor had made the state-
ment that appellant was accused of taking some $2 in cash and a target 
pistol from Mr. Timms, and that car keys and other personal belongings 
were taken from other individuals present during the robbery. 
(T.11-13) The court denied the motion (T.12). The trial judge then 
informed counsel for appellant that he would allow the State's attorney 
to amend the Bill of Particulars if necessary. (T.13) The 
prosecuting attorney then stated that he would move to amend the 
Bill of Particulars if necessary, but he didn't think it was 
necessary. (T.14) In fact, the Bill was never amended. On 
numerous occasions the trial court allowed in evidence over the 
objection of appellant's attorney, testimony that other individuals 
besides Ms. Bradley and Ms. Harris were robbed (T.26), (T.80), 
(T.105). It is appellant's contention that by refusing to grant his 
motion for mistrial, and by allowing into evidence testimony of criminal 
conduct not specified in the Information or the Bill of Particulars, 
that the court committed error prejudicial to the defendant's right 
to a fair trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court, as well as virtually every other court 
in the country, has long recognized the importance of the pleadings, 
particularly the Information and Bill of Particulars, in a criminal 
case. In State v. Anderson, 116 P.2d 398 (1941) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
-6-
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"The pleadings, that is, the information, the bill 
of particulars, the plea, form the issues and limit 
the accusation to the matters therein alleged and 
denied." (Emphasis Supplied) 116 P.2d at 400. 
This position was further amplified by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of State v. Spencer, 121 P.2d 912 (1942) in which 
the court declared: 
"The issue established by an information or a complaint 
and a plea of not guilty thereto constitute the foundation 
of each criminal trial. Upon those issues the relevancy 
of the proffered evidence is determined, such for instance 
is the question of the relevancy of the facts, ultimate 
or probative, set out in the bill of particulars. . . 
In the recent case of State v. Hill, 116 P.2d 392, 397, 
we said: It is elemental that where a bill of particulars is 
furnished it may not set out a different crime than that 
charged in the information. If, then, the information is 
indefinite as to the offense charged it is of no help 
in deciding those questions of the relevancy of evidence . . . " 
121 P.2d at 913. 
Specifically with regard to the bill of particulars, the 
Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Solomon, 93 U.70, 371 P.2d 104 
(1937) , that the granting of a Bill of Particulars is not discretionary 
with the court, but under the statute is a right which defendant can 
demand and which the court must grant if statutory conditions are 
present. Numerous other Utah Supreme Court decisions have upheld 
this important purpose of the Bill of Particulars statute, Utah Code 
Ann. §77-21-9 (1953). 
The trial court's decision in the instant case to allow 
the State to present evidence of crimes that had not been outlined 
in the Information and Bill of Particulars was a violation of the 
principles of criminal law followed by the Utah Supreme Court since 
1940 as discussed previously. Appellant maintains that the surprise 
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to him of the State presenting evidence of crimes other than those 
specified in the Information and Bill of Particulars unfairly 
prejudiced him and denied him his right to due process of law. As 
appellant's attorney pointed out to the trial court, appellant 
was unprepared for the evidence that a gun belonging to Kenneth 
Timms was alleged to have been stolen from him at the same time 
Barbara Harris and Brenda Bradley were allegedly robbed. (T.14) 
This fact became crucial when, in rebuttal to appellant's witness, 
the State called Thomas Baron, a detective with the Tucson, Arizona 
Police Department, who testified that he arrested defense witness 
Kenneth Wells in Tucson on July 17 and found in the car Wells was in 
a gun later identified by Kenneth Timms as the one stolen from him 
in the alleged robbery on June 30 in Salt Lake City (T.273-275 and 
T. 280-284). Appellant was totally unprepared for this testimony, 
and made a motion for mistrial after it was completed (T.297-298). 
The Court denied the motion (T.299). 
It is appellant1s contention that he was unable to prepare 
properly for this rebuttal testimony despite having used all of the 
procedural tools available to him under Utah Law. Appellant was not 
charged as a principle or accessory to a theft of a gun from Kenneth 
Timms. In its Bill of Particulars the State did not give notice 
to appellant that he was charged with theft of a gun from Kenneth 
Timms. To allow the State to so subvert the rules of pleading with 
respect to criminal cases is to deny effect to legislative requirements 
and condone the prosecution's hiding of key evidence from the defense. 
-•* „ *-v»-j
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new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL 
TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS, BRENDA MOORE BRADLEY 
REGARDING HER USE OF HEROIN ON THE DATE THE ROBBERY IS 
ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURED. 
In cross-examination of the State1s witness, Brenda Moore 
Bradley, the following exchange occurred: 
"MR. KELLER; On June 30, 1975, when this incident occuired, 
had you used any heroin? 
MR. YOCOM: Objection, your honor. 
COURT: Sustained 
MR. KELLER: Your honor it is certainly relevant. 
COURT: I have sustained the objection counsel." 
It is the position of appellant that the trial court's refusal 
to allow him to question the witness regarding her use of heroin on 
the date the alleged robberyoccurred was a denial of his rights 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-24-1 (1953), and Rule 20 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, as well as a denial of his right to Due Process 
of Law pursuant to the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
§78-24-1 (1953) states: 
". . . although, in every case the credibility of the 
witness may be drawn in question by the evidence affecting 
his character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by 
his motives, or by contradictory evidence . . ." 
Furthermore Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states 
as follows: 
"Rule 20. Evidence generally affecting credibility. 
Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for the purpose of impairing 
or supporting the credibility of a witness, any partv Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
including the party calling him may examine him and 
introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any statement or 
conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the 
issues of credibility.11 
Appellant maintains that in order for him to determine the 
perceptive powers and abilities of the witness, Brenda Bradley, 
it was necessary for the jury to determine whether or not her 
perception had been affected by the use of heroin. Therefore, he 
should have been able to ask this question and to have received an 
answer for it. To allow otherwise is to prevent the defendant 
from inquiring as to the perceptive abilities of the witness at the 
time about which she is testifying. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of counsel being able to test the credibility 
of a witness with respect to taking drugs. In State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 
795 (1975), the Court stated: 
11
. . . (I)t is in the scope of cross-examination of a 
witness to inquire as to anything which may reasonably 
be regarded as affecting the accuracy or credibility of his 
testimony. This includes matters which would test his 
ability to observe and understand, or his memory, or his 
capacity to adequately relate his knowledge of the facts.11 
530 P.2d at 797. 
In the Mason case, the Court ruled that it was not error for the 
trial court to have allowed the prosecutor to inquire into the subject 
of a witness1 use of heroin prior to testifying in that trial. The 
situation may easily be likened to the question of the credibility 
of a witness in perceiving an event about which he is testifying. 
Based on the foregoing it seems clear that the trial court should 
have allowed counsel to ask the question and receive an answer 
-10-
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concerning the witness' use of heroin, and failure to do so denied 
him his rights pursuant to the Utah Statutes aforementioned and his 
Constitutional right to due process of law pursuant to the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. 
POINT III 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN QUESTIONING CERTAIN 
WITNESSES CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Although defense witness Kenneth Wells testified that he 
had been arrested in Tucson, Arizona for the crime of robbery which 
was subsequently dismissed against him (T.206), the prosecutor made 
a series of inquiries which culminated in the following question: 
"MR. YOCOM: You are arrested for armed robbery, doesnft 
that mean you had a gun with you? 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I object. 
COURT: Objection sustained. 
MR. KELLER: At this time I have a motion to make outside 
the presence of the jury if I may, I think its necessary, 
this court has cautioned Mr. Yocom andhe persists. 
COURT: Objection is overruled, court will hear your motion 
at the recess." 
(T.209-210) 
The only mention of the crime for which Mr. Wells had been 
arrested occurred in the following exchange: 
"MR. YOCOM: How did you get arrested? 
MR. KELLER: I am going to object, your Honor. 
COURT: Objection sustained. 
MR. YOCOM: Were you arrested on this offense down there? 
A: I was arrested for probation violation. 
Q: You are sure about that? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Repeat yourself. 
You are sure about that? 
I was arrested in Tucson. 
Uh huh. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A: When I was arrested they arrested me for robbery but the 
case was dismissed so Salt Lake County had a fugitive report 
on me for probation violation." 
(T.206) 
At no time did Mr. Wells testify that he had been arrested 
for the crime of armed robbery, or that he had been charged with 
having a gun in his possession or committing any crime with a gun. 
The prosecutor's question clearly placed evidence before the jury 
that was prejudicial not only to the testimony of the witness but 
in the overall sense to the testimony of the appellant, since 
the appellant later admitted that he and Mr. Wells had driven 
to Tucson, Arizona together. The thrust of the prosecutor's approach 
was to put the two in concert with respect to committing armed 
robberies. 
Later in the trial during the questioning of the appellant, 
the following exchange occurred:" 
"MR. YOCOM: Did you ever have a.38 caliber revolver in your 
possession in Tucson, Arizona? 
MR. MITCHELL: No. 
Q: Did you ever have a.38 caliber revolver under your bed 
at the hotel you were arrested in? 
A: No." 
(T.224) 
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No evidence that appellant ever possessed a .38 caliber 
revolver in Arizona was ever introduced by the prosecution, and 
therefore the assumptions of such facts which were not in evidence 
placed the seed in the minds of the jury that the prosecution hoped 
would germinate into a belief that the defendant did in fact possess 
a .38 caliber revolver and in concert with the previous witness, 
Kenneth Wells, went around committing robberies. 
Counsel for appellant objected to this form of questioning 
by Mr. Yocom, and later in the trial made a motion for a mistrial 
based on the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's questions as 
discussed above. (T.291-298) The Court denied the motion. (T.299). 
In a long line of cases, this Court has set the limits on 
prosecutorial actions in court. In State v. Jameson, 134 P.2d 173 
(1943), this Court stated: 
"Both the court and the prosecutor should be zealous in 
protecting the rights of an accused, and should carefully 
refrain from doing or saying anything from which it might 
be inferred that an unfair advantage was taken of a defendant." 
134 P.2d at 175 
Further in State v. Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957) 
Justice Crockett, writing for a majority of the Court stated: 
"It is not to be questioned that a prosecutor has the duty 
to proceed in good faith and not to offer evidence which he 
knows is objectionable for the alterior purpose of informing 
the jury that such evidence may exist." 307 P.2d at 216. 
In State v. Martinez, 326 P.2d 102 7 U.2d 387 (1958), three 
defendants were charged with rape. During the course of the trial 
in the lower court, the prosecutor had asked several questions of one 
of the defendants as to his having been an inmate of the State School, 
how long he had been an inmate there, when he was released, if he had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and as to the closeness of his relationship with him. The Court 
held that such questions on the part of the prosecutor constituted 
reversable error. Writing for the majority Justice Henroid held: 
"The questions were pointed, pressing and repeated, over 
objection. We are convinced that such line of questioning 
could have accomplished nothing save an installation in 
the veneerman's minds that here was a worthless lot, and 
that such questions and answers had no probative value 
in the establishment of the offense charged here. It was 
a line akin to that which would attempt to prove 
previous offenses having no connection or probative value 
in the establishment of the commission of a later offense, 
a procedure which this court has refused to sanction." 
326 P.2d at 103. 
The Utah Supreme Court made its most distinct pronouncements 
on the issue before the Court in the cases of State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d 
8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), and State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 383 P.2d 
407 (1963). In those cases, this court reversed convictions because 
the prosecution had injected testimony concerning the defendant being 
implicated in other crimes, and where it appeared that the main purpose 
and effect was to disgrace the defendant in the minds of the jury. 
In State v. Dickson, supra, the Court reversed the conviction 
of a defendant for the crime of robbery. The court in that case 
ruled that evidence of similar crimes committed by a defendant may be 
introduced, where the similarity of circumstances was such that 
it would justify receiving the evidence. However, the court stated: 
But is is obvious that the requirement of some similarity 
peculiar to the two crimes is not satisfied by the mere 
fact that two men were involved in the similar crime, and 
that the elements common to all crimes of that type 
were made out.,! 361 P. 2d at 414. 
The prosecutor had questioned the defendant in that case 
concerning an incident which had occured at Fort Worth, Texas sub-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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questioning the court held: 
"Although it has been stated that the trial court has some 
discretion as to cross-examination with respect to other 
crimes for impeachment purposes, we are aware of no authority 
which goes so far as to allow such questioning as that 
here: Where the fact adduced is only that the witness has 
been charged with such a crime. Nor do we think that such 
reason or justice would support any such conclusion." 
361 P.2d at 414 
"The universally accepted general rule is that such evidence 
is not admissible if its effect is merely to disgrace the 
defendant or show his propensity to commit crime." 
361 P.2d at 412. 
It is clear that in the instant case there was no similarity 
among the crimes which allegedly occurred in Tucson, Arizona and the 
crime which had allegedly occurred in Salt Lake City. The crime 
which allegedly occured in Tucson was subsequent to the crime which 
had allegedly occurredin Salt Lake City, and there was no conviction 
of either the witness Wells or the appellant in the Arizona cases. 
It seems clear that the testimony solicited by the prosecutor 
concerning Mr. Wells and Mr. Mitchell's arrest in Tucson, Arizona 
was immaterial for any purpose other than to "disgrace the defendant 
or show his propensity to commit crime". Therefore, the prosecutor's 
conduct falls squarely within the prohibition of the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Dickson. As to its prejudicial effect, the court 
in the Dickson case used reasoning which applies very clearly in the 
instant case also: 
"Inasmuch as we cannot say with any degree of assurance 
that there would not have been a different result in the 
absence of the error in cross-examining the defendant about 
the incident in Texas, it must be regarded as prejudicial 
and the case remanded for a new trial." 361 P.2d at 415 
1 r 
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In State v. Kazda, supra, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction of a defendant for the crime of assault with intent to 
commit murder and armed robbery. In that case the court allowed 
over the objection of defendant, testimony from an FBI agent 
concerning a prior interview with the defendant which involved the 
defendant's admissions as to involvements in other crimes. At one 
time in that case, the trial court had admonished the jury that 
any offenses mentioned in the interrogation should be disregarded 
since they did not tend to connect the defendant with the instant case. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Callister said: 
"We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial error. 
It implied that the defendant was implicated in other 
crimes, none of them proven, and could have no other 
effect than to degrade the defendant and give to the jury the 
impression that he had a propensity for crime. It is 
true that the defendant admitted prior felony convictions, but 
'we cannot say with any degree of assurance that there 
would not have been a different result1 in the absence 
of such testimony."* 
Reversed and remanded for a new trial." 382 P.2d at 409. 
It is clear that it has been the policy of the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah to reverse criminal convictions in situations 
where a prosecutor has elicited testimony from witnesses concerning 
a defendant's criminal activity which has not resulted in a felony 
conviction. This has been true even where the court was not certain 
that such questioning had a prejudicial effect on the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. It has been the Court's policy whenever 
such incidents occur during a trial to give the defendant the benefit 
of the doubt unless it could say for certain that there would have 
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been a different result. It seems clear that the prosecutor's 
purpose in eliciting the testimony from Mr. Wells and appellant in 
the instant case was to show that "here was a worthless pair" who had 
a propensity to commit crime and be in possession of guns. There 
can be no other explanation for the fact that the prosecutor 
elicited such testimony. Therefore, appellant's motion for mistrial 
based on the testimony should have been granted by the trial court, 
and the judgment of the trial court in refusing to grant such motion 
should be reversed and the appellant's case remanded for a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURTrS REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO PRESENT 
TESTIMONY SHOWING THAT ONE OF THE STATE'S KEY WITNESSES 
COMMITTED PERJURY WAS A DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW7 
At the trial, the appellant called as his witness Barbara 
Harris who had previously testified for the prosecution. The 
following exchange took place between appellant's counsel and the 
witness: 
"MR. KELLER: Have you ever lied under oath, Mrs. Harris. 
MRS. HARRIS: No I have not. 
MR. KELLER: Do you recall at the preliminary hearing in this 
matter me asking you whether you have ever sold heroin and 
you stated no, I haven't? 
MRS. HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. KELLER: Is that the truth? 
MRS. HARRIS: Yes, it is." (T.244) 
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There seems no question that Mrs. Harris testified under 
oath at the trial in the instant matter, as well as the 
preliminary hearing that she had never sold heroin to anyone. 
It is appellant's contention that he had the right to impeach 
that testiomny by bringing forward any witnesses that could 
present competent evidence that Mrs. Harris had sold heroin. To 
that end appellant called as his next witness, Darryle Riddle. 
Mr. Riddle testified that he was an undercover agent with the 
Salt Lake City Police Department during September and October of 
1975. He further testified that it was his duty to make undercover 
narcotic buys. After appellant's counsel had asked the witness 
whether or not he knew a person named Barbara Harris and the 
witness had responded affirmatively the prosecutor asked to 
approach the bench and voir dire the witness. After the voir dire 
the following exchange took place: 
"MR. YOCOM: Your honor, I would renew my objection 
made at the bench that this witness' testimony with regard 
to his work with the police department, September and 
October 1975, is totally immaterial to this case and 
I would object to any further testimony with regard to 
whatever counsel is trying to elicit. 
COURT: Objection will be sustained. 
-18-
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MR. KELLER: If it will please the court, I would like an 
opportunity to argue this matter outside the presence of the 
jury if I may. 
COURT: Objection will be sustained, you may proceed 
MR. KELLER: By sustaining the objection . . . . 
COURT: I sustained the objection counsel, and you may either 
proceed with this witness or call another witness on matters 
not objected to." 
(T.246-247) 
At an appropriate recess, counsel for appellant made the 
following proffer on the record: 
"MR. KELLER: Your honor, I previously was required by the court 
to make a proffer of proof as to the testimony of a witness 
I was going to call and in order to preserve my objection for 
the record, I think it is necessary that the proffer be on the 
record and I ask for the opportunity to do that at this time. 
COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. KELLER: The testimony of the undercover agent Riddle would 
have been that on I believe it was September 29th of this 
year, and again on October 2nd or 3rd of 1975, he purchased 
heroin from Barbara Harris at her residence. I had previously 
asked is the Court aware the question of Barbara Harris whether 
or not she lied under oath, she said no. I indicated to her 
and she admitted that she had denied ever having sold heroin 
on November 4th, 1975, at preliminary hearing in this 
matter. I believe I'm entitled to impeach her statements that 
she had in fact never sold heroin by presenting the testimony 
of the officer, and I again renew my request of the Court to 
allow me to impeach her testimony by presenting the officer. 
Is the Court aware if the difficulty on this case is based on 
the fact that the robbery occured but involving a theft of 
heroin and they say no heroin existed. In order to get a fair 
trial, I think the jury is entitled to know that she has in 
fact lied under oath on prior occasions and this was my intent 
in presenting this testimony from the officer and I ask the Court 
to allow me to do it. 
COURT: Is that the only basis upon which you offer the 
testimony of the officer? 
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MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I understand that the fact that 
Barbara Harris may have sold heroin three months later may, 
in and of itself not be admissible in Court, but the fact that 
I was able to ask her that at preliminary hearing and she 
denied having done so, 1 think means she has in fact 
lied under oath, committed perjury. 
COURT: Is that the total of your proffer? 
MR. KELLER: Yes, Your Honor. 
COURT: Motion will be denied, proffer will be denied.ff 
It is appellant's contention that by being allowed to present 
the testimony of the undercover agent he would have been able to 
show that the witness Barbara Harris committed perjury at the trial 
on the instant matter, and the Court's refusal to allow him to persent 
such evidence severely prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair 
trial. American Jurisprudence Second states the general rule to be 
as follows: 
"No witness is entitled to a false aura of veracity. It is the 
province of the jury to assess the credibility of a witness, 
and hence it must be aware of facts which might cause a witness 
to be less than fully truthful^and is entitled to any 
information which might significantly bear on the credibility 
of a witness. Accordingly, a party is entitled to an opportunity 
to impeach a witness sworn on behalf of the other side and to 
discredit his testimony." (Citing cases) 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses 
§518. 
In Utah, these principles have been clearly enunciated by 
statute and case law. Utah Code Ann. §78-24-1 (1953) states as 
follows: 
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"All persons, without exception, otherwise than as 
specified in this chapter, who, having organs of sense, 
can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known their 
perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Neither 
parties nor other persons who have an interest in the 
event of an action or proceeding are excluded; Nor 
those who have been convicted of crimes; nor persons 
on account of their opinions on matters of religious 
beliefs; although, in every case the credibility of the 
witness may be drawn in question, by the manner in which 
he testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by 
evidencing effecting his character for truth, honesty or 
integrity, or by his motives, or by contradictory 
evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of his 
credibility." (Emphasis Supplied;- ~ 
This statute has been interpreted by a long line of Utah 
Supreme Court cases to allow a party a full and complete opportunity 
to impeach and discredit opposing witnesses. See State v. Marks, 
16 U. 204 51 T. 1089 (1898); State v. Olson, 100 U. 174, 111 P.2d 
548 (1941); and Le Grande Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 U.2d 
260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966). In the instant case, it was appellant's 
defense that he had gone to the house at 1144 South Second East 
where Barbara Harris resided to purchase heroin. Appellant further 
defended himself on the grounds that what he had done was steal 
several balloons of heroin from the house at that address and that 
he had not used any type of weapon, or force or fear to accomplish 
the theft. Therefore, appellant argued, if he was guilty of 
any crime it was the crime of theft and not aggravated robbery as 
charged in the information. Depending on the value assigned to the 
balloons of heroin, if any, defendant would have been guilty of a 
much lesser offense, but at least not guilty of the crime charged 
in the Information. This defense was supported by the testimony of 
Kenneth Wells, who claimed he was with the defendant and described 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the theft of the heroin, but denied that an armed robbery occurred. 
(T.189-199, 196) Appellant himself testified to the facts as outline 
above. (T.216-222, 220) As noted above, the undercover agent would 
have testified that he had purchased heroin from Barbara Harris 
at that address on or about September 29, of 1975 and again on 
October 2nd or 3rd of 1975. (T.248) It is clear that the defendant 
could have established that Barbara Harris was in fact selling 
heroin from the residence in which she claims she was robbed during 
the period of time in question. Such testimony would have had the 
effect of corroborating the testimony of appellant and Kenneth Wells 
that they had gone to the Harris residence to purchase heroin and that 
heroin had been stolen, and failure to allow this critical piece 
of evidence to be admitted severely prejudiced the defendant's right 
to a fair trial by depriving the jury of the facts which would have 
supported the appellant's theory of his defense. 
Even more important, however, is the fact that the witness 
•Barbara Harris denied having ever sold heroin to anyone. It is clear 
that had appellant's counsel been able to introduce the evidence that 
the undercover agent had purchased heroin on two occasions from 
Barbara Harris it would have substantially impeached her testimony 
and proven that she had committed perjury, not only at the preliminary 
hearing but at the trial in the instant matter. Therefore, appellant's 
right to present witnesses on his own behalf, and to impeach the 
testimony of the witnesses against him was severely limited by the 
trial court's ruling that the testimony of the witness Riddle could 
not be presented. It is clear that the defendant's Due Process right 
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to a fair trial and his right pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-24-1 
(1953) was substantially prejudiced. Since the Court cannot say 
with any liklihood or assurance that such testimony would have 
resulted in a different verdict, then the error was prejudicial; 
this is especially true in light of the defense expounded by 
appellant that no guns were used, and nothing was taken as far as 
he knew, other than heroin itself. The error made by the trial 
court in excluding the proffered testimony was substantial and 
prejudicial and its decision must be reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the issues and arguments presented in this 
brief it is respectfully requested that the judgment of the trial 
court be reversed and the case be remanded for a new trial consistant 
with the Court's opinion in the matter. 
Respectfully submitted L . 
KELLER 
AttorneV/for Appellant 
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